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Abstract
Group Signature, extension of digital signature, allows members of a group to 
sign messages on behalf of the group, such that the resulting signature does not 
reveal the identity of the signer. Any client can verify the authenticity of the 
document by using the public key parameters of the group. In case of dispute, 
only a designated group manager, because of his special property, is able to 
open signatures, and thus reveal the signer’s identity. Its applications are 
widespread, especially in e-commerce such as e-cash, e-voting and e-auction.
This thesis incorporates the detailed study of various group signature schemes, 
their cryptographic concepts and the main contributions in this field. We 
implemented a popular group signature scheme based upon elliptic curve 
cryptosystems. Moreover, the group signature is dynamic i.e. remains valid, if 
some members leave the group or some new members join the group. Full 
traceability feature is also included in the implemented scheme. For enhanced 
security the the scheme implements distributed roles of the group manager. We 
also analysed various security features, formal models, challenges and 
cryptanalysis of some significant contributions in this area. 
Keywords: anonymity; eliptic curve; digital signature; unforgeability; discrete 
logarithm
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1. Introduction 
A vital role in our lives is nowadays played by cryptography, mainly in 
information technologies, sometimes we even do not realize how relevant. We 
use it every time we communicate with our bank, we require secrecy during 
browsing the web, while sending an email to and there are also many other 
situations where we want to keep our data secret[38]. Sometimes, we just want 
to hide our and addressee identity. Also group signatures have inconsiderable 
importance, as it was mentioned, mainly in information technologies.  
A digital signature is a computational technique in cryptography in order to 
facilitate the authorization of a digital message or document. A valid digital 
signature proves the receiver that the message was sent in by an valid sender, 
also  the sender cannot lie about not having sent the message and that the 
information was not tampered in its course. This techinique of cryptography is 
basically applied in software industry, financial transactions, and in cases of 
legal disputes where there is a necessity to track frauds or counterfeiting of 
information[38]. 
Extending the idea of digital signature schemes into groups, a new signature 
scheme i.e. group signature scheme, first introduced by Chaum and Heyst in 
1991, provides authority to any group member to sign messages anonymously 
on behalf of the group [1]. A client can verify the authenticity of the signature 
by using only the group's public key parameters. It must be computationally 
hard to identity of the group member so that he cannot be linked from a signed 
message or his signature. However, in the case of a legal dispute, the identity of 
a signer or member can be revealed by a designated entity i.e. the group 
manager. The major feature of group signature is the security of the 
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information or the data that makes it more important as well as attractive for 
many real time applications, such as e-commerce, e-auction and e-voting, 
where the priority is privacy and anonymity of signer which is very much high 
and important for any organization. 
As mentioned above, group signature scheme was first introduced by David 
Chaum and Eugene van Heyst [1]. They presented that time a new type of 
signature for a group of persons (of course, they do not have to be humans 
necessarily, but for example computers in the network, smart/sim cards etc.) 
satisfying the following properties [1]: 
(1) none but members of the group only can sign messages; 
(2) the receiver of message can verify that the message received by him is 
signed by a valid authorized group member, but he can not discover identity of 
group member making the signature; 
(3) if necessary in case of legal dispute, the anonymity of the group member 
who signed the message is revealed. 
Thus, as seen from the first and second property, one of the major points of the 
group signature scheme is to provide anonymity to its signers (i.e. group 
members). Every group member has a private secret key which enables him to 
sign messages, but resultant signature maintains the secrecy of the identity of 
the signer. The third property tells, there is an higher entity (generally called 
group manager) who has the power and resources to track the signing member, 
or reveal the signer’s identity by using a special algorithm. Revocation of 
members is supported by some systems as well [3], i.e., where group member 
can be revoked (or disabled) without putting any affect the ability to sign of 
unrevoked members (in this thesis, this case is treated). 
Chaum and van Heyst described a “classical” example as an application of 
group signature thet we can mention[1]. Let a company which has a number of 
computers be considered, each of which is connected to the company’s local 
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network. Company has also departments, all of which have their own printers 
(connected to the network). Only members of the department are allowed to 
use their department’s printer. Therefore, before printing, printer must be 
convinced that the user is from its department. Also, company (or users) 
require privacy, so member’s name must not be revealed. But in case, if it is 
necessary like in a legal dispute, for example if someone prints too much, 
senior authority in charge  must be able to discover or reveal his identity. 
A number of group signature schemes followed and have been proposed after 
the initial scheme proposed by D. Chaum and van Heyst . A dynamic group 
signature scheme was architectured by Chen and Pedersen, that allows new 
members to join the group anytime. Usage of group signatures in e-bidding[2] 
was also suggested by them. The first group signature scheme that could be 
used for large groups was put forward by Camenisch and Stadler  as in that 
scheme the public key of the group and the signatures have lengths that do not 
depend on the size of the group [4]. Later, a scheme to support efficient 
revocation of group members was proposed by Kim et al.Some obstacles 
hindering the way of real world applications of group signatures were brought 
forward by Ateniese and Tsudik, like coalition attacks and member 
deletion[13]. 
In the literature review, it was observed that currently the available group 
signature schemes can be differentiated into two types, firstly registration by a 
public-key, and secondly a certificate-based type. In the first protocol, keys are 
constructed by using only groups of known order. However, in above 
mentioned schemes, both the keys of the group and the size of signature are not 
independant of the number of group members. This a serious problem 
considering groups with huge number of members. In the second protocol, a 
certificate of membership is given to each member of the group, and the group 
signature is based on secret public key of membership certificate. Therefore, 
neither the group public key nor the size of the signatures of members depend 
on the number of members in the group. 
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1.1 Motivation 
 
A we know of digital signature and facilities it has provided regarding 
information security, so extending the idea of digital signature to group where 
we can parallely authorize multiple information or documents and save time. 
Group Signatures have vital role in day to day corporate organizations’ e-
commerce applications. Increase in demand for a more secure and lesser 
complex Group Signature scheme has always been there. The scheme 
implemented by us provides these features. The use of elliptic curve 
cryptography increases the security the scheme by providing desired security 
level that is achieved by significantly smaller keys in elliptic curve system than 
in its counterpart- RSA system. Another significant advantage being in general, 
the algorithms used for encryption and decryption in ECC schemes are faster 
and can be run on machines that are less efficient. 
 
1.2 Basic Concepts and Requirements of 
Group Signature 
 
A technique of authorizing the documents, messages or relevant information 
anonymously on behalf of group by any member belonging to it is termed as a 
group signature scheme, where the group consists of a manager and valid 
members shown in Figure 1.1. The integrity of sign is verified by a trusted 
verifier, where he is aware of the sign’s correctness but not the identity of the 
signing member. This concept of group signature put forward by Chaum and 
Heyst which allows any member of a group to authorize message on behalf of 
the group. According to their scheme, the following policies must be included 
in  any group signature scheme: 
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• Group members are only role persons to authorize the messages by 
signing them. 
• The validation of the signature should be verified without the identity of 
the signer being revealed 
• If a situation of necessity arises, the signature can be opened to reveal 
the anonymity of signer. 
 
In group signature schemes, the only person capable of addition of new 
members and revoking of the existing members from the group is the group 
manager. In case of legal disputes, if any, the responsibility of revealing the 
identity of the member or signer is of group manager’s. Also we have to take 
care that all channels used during the communication are not synchronous 
which says the sender after putting a message though the channel does not need 
to wait for the receiver to receive the message off the channel. The channel 
communication between the sender and the receiver is assumed to be 
anonymous. Basic terms used in the group signature schemes are group public 
key which the verifier uses to check the validation of the signature, group’s 
secret key which is used by a member of group to generate his signature and 
the group manager's secret key that is used to track the identity of the signing 
member. A standardized group signature scheme contains the following five 
phases[18]: 
 
1 setup phase: group manager computes the public key and the secret key 
in this phase by implementing the algorithm for group key generation. 
He inputs a security parameter to the algorithm and it returns the group 
public key and also the secret key of group manager. The secret key is 
kept with him and the group public key is circulated among the 
members. 
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2. Join phase: an interactive protocol is established in this phase between 
the group manager and the to-be-member after which the user becomes 
a valid group member. A secret key is chosen by the Group member 
using which another parameter is generated by the member. This 
generated parameter is sent to the group manager. Then using his own 
secret key the group manager generates the group member’s signing key 
and returns it to newly joined group member. 
 
3. Sign phase:  This is the signing phase in which an protocol is established 
between the group member and the verifier where he has to verify a 
group signature whether it is generated by a valid group member or not. 
Group member uses the signing key pairs to sign the message. The 
generated group member signature of knowledge is sent by the member 
to the verifier for verification. 
4. Verify phase: This phase implements a deterministic algorithm using 
given group public key and the signed message to verify the validity of 
the group signature. Signer sends his signature to the verifier, i.e. the 
signature generated by the signature of knowledge. The message is 
accepted if true value is returned by the verification phase else the 
message is rejected if false value is returned by the verification phase. 
5. Open phase: This phase implements a deterministic algorithm to reveal 
the identity of the signer, by taking input a signed message and the 
secret key of group manager. The signature is taken as input by the 
group manager and using the private parameters outputs the identity of 
the signer as return value. This open algorithm is implemented when a 
incident of a legal dispute arises. 
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1.3   Properties 
 
• Anonymity: Given a sign which is valid must be difficult for anyone to 
discover the identity of the signer computationally. As the constant 
differs every time, the same member generates different signature for 
every new message to be signed. The group manager only can determine 
the identity of the signing member using his secret key. For a non-
member it is almost not possible to discover the secret parameters of the 
signing group member as the knowledge of the secret key of the group 
manager is required and so without the secret key of the group manager 
it is almost impossible to determine the secret parameters of the signer 
and hence an outsider cannot cannot determined the identity of the 
signer. In this property we conclude that if neither group manager’s 
secret key nor group member’s secret key is exposed then it is infeasible 
to reveal the signer of a authorized valid signature. 
• Unforgeability: Only a valid authorized member belonging to the group 
can produce a valid signature i.e. a valid member only can produce a 
signature on behlf of his group. 
• Unlinkability: This property states that deciding if two valid signatures 
were generated by the same group member is difficult. According to this 
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property one cannot conclude that both signatures are from the same 
member or not if he’s provided with two signatures. 
• Traceability: Using only open algorithm and the group manager's secret 
key,  the group manager can track the identity of the signing member if 
given any valid signature. Like in case of any legal dispute or  
emergencies, any signer’s identity can be traced by the group manager 
only. It is not possible for an outsider to track the signer because open 
algorithm, which used to trace a signing group member, requires the 
knowledge of the secret key of the group manager. 
• Exculpability: The group members even alongwith the group manager 
are not able to sign a document on behalf of any other group member. 
The knowledge of the secret parameters of the group member is required 
to generate a valid signature. And every member has his own unique 
secret key that are used to generate the signature. Even a group manager 
cannot sign on behalf of any group member because the group manager 
does not have the members’ secret keys. 
 
1.4  Elliptic curve cryptography
 
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was first introduced in 1985 independently 
by N. Koblitz and V. Miller[18]. They proposed to use elliptic curves in 
cryptographic schemes. In 1990’s, elliptic curve schemes went through 
commercial acceptance. EC cryptography schemes are public-key mechanisms 
which are able to give the same facilities as the schemes of RSA or ElGamal. 
But the security of ECC is based on a hardness of another problem, known as 
the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). The best algorithms to 
solve ECDLP have full exponential-time (unlike RSA’s algorithms which have 
the subexponential-time). Thus, required security level can by achieved with 
significantly smaller keys in elliptic curve system than in its rival- RSA system. 
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For example, in general it is accepted that a 160-bit elliptic curve key can give 
the security of same level as a 1024-bit RSA key. One more advantage of ECC 
schemes over others is that, encryption and decryption algorithms in ECC 
schemes are faster as well are able to run on machines which are less efficient. 
 
1.5  Problem Statement 
The objective of thesis is to study and review existing group signature schemes, 
elliptic curve cryptography concepts, finally implementing a group signature 
scheme based on following assumptions: 
• Group signature scheme based upon hard computational assumptions, 
such as, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)  
• Group signature scheme should be unaffected by joining or leaving of 
any member. 
• Group signature scheme must satisfy all basic security requiremenst like 
anonymity, traceability, and unlinkability. 
 1.6 Organization of Thesis 
 
This thesis is organized as follows, Chapter 2 gives a brief introduction of 
preliminaries of cryptography. An existing scheme is described in Chapter 3. 
alongwith its security analysis and corectness evaluation. Discussion about 
implementation and result is depicted in Chapter 4. Finally conclusion in 
Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Survey 
 
In this chapter, we have reviewed the literature related to various group 
signature schemes and their security features. First, we have given a brief 
overview of cryptography concepts then preliminaries related to elliptic curve 
cryptography[36], hash functions[31], random number generations[32], and 
prime number with primality test[35]. Later, we have reviewed some popular 
group signature schemes based on their security features. 
 
 
2.1 Cryptography Concepts and Signature    
Requirements 
 
Cryptography could be characterized as securing data by transforming it into an 
unreadable structure, called cipher text. Just those who have a secret key can 
decipher the message into plain text[38]. Encoded messages can sometimes be 
broken by cryptanalysis, also called code breaking, in spite of the fact that 
present day cryptography techniques are virtually unbreakable. Cryptography 
system might be extensively classified into symmetric-key system which uses a 
single key that both the sender and recipient have, and asymmetric-key system 
which uses two keys, a public key known to everybody and a private key which 
just the recipient of messages uses, yet in case of the signature, it needs a 
public key system where the signer signs with private key and the verifier 
verfies with the signer's public key. 
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2.1.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
First, we will do an  assessment of some primitives of finite fields. Mostly, 
finite field F is an algebraic structure (F,+, ·) that contains a set F and two 
operations (+) and (·), holding the following properties: 
(1) F is an additive group with reference to operation (+); 
(2) F \ {0} is an multiplicative group with reference to operation (·); 
(3) for all a, b, c ∈ F supports 
a · (b + c) = (a · b) + (a · c) and (a + b) · c = (a · c) + (b · c). 
 
Two types of finite fields are employed in elliptic curve cryptography thus 
there are two types of elliptic curves as follows: 
(1) Elliptic curves over a field Fp = {0, 1, . . . , p−1} of prime characterization p; 
(2) Elliptic curves over a field 2mF  = {0, 1, . . . , 2
m
 − 1} of characterization 2. 
 
Only first type of fields employed for elliptic curve cryptography will be used 
in this paper. Now, we can define an elliptic curve over a finite field. 
 
Definition 2. An elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp is elucidated by an 
equation of the form 
E : 2 3y x ax b= + +  (mod p),………………………………………………………… (1) 
where a, b ∈ Fp and ∆ = 3 24 27a b+ ≠ 0 (mod p). 
 
An equation (1) is called simplified Weierstrass equation (general form of 
Weierstrass equation is required for curves over a field 2mF ), ∆ is known as 
discriminant of elliptic curve E and the condition that ∆ ≠ 0 makes certain that 
curve is “smooth”, or that is, there are no points at which the curve has more 
than one discrete tangent lines. A pair (x, y), where x, y ∈ Fp, is a point on the 
curve if (x, y) meets equation (1). The point at infinity represented by ∞, is also 
assumed to be on the curve. The set of all points on E is given by E(Fp). 
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Strictly,  
2 2 3( ) {(x,y) F ; } { }p pE F y x ax b= ∈ = + + ∪ ∞ . 
 
Fig. 2.1 Examples of elliptic curves in R2. 
 
Elliptic curve cryptography schemes might be utilized as public-key 
mechanisms that give the same functionality as RSA or Elgamal schemes. 160-
bit elliptic curve key gives the same level of security as a 1024-bit RSA key. 
Calculations for encryption and unscrambling for ECC schemes are quicker 
and could be run on less productive machines.  
For the same level of security for every best presently known attacks, elliptic 
curve-based frameworks might be implemented with much littler parameters, 
prompting huge performance advantages. The performance advantages of 
elliptic curves in the SSL/TLS protocol have been analyzed in profundity. 
 
 
Table 2.1. Key sizes for equal security levels(in bits). 
 16 
 
A cryptographic hash function is hash function which transforms random block 
of information and provides a fixed size string where each data is mapped such 
that any modification would vary the value of hash with very high 
probability[31]. The information to be concealed is known to be the message 
and the hash value obtained is known as the message digest or digest. Ideally 
the hash function must satisfy certain qualities, firstly should be staright-
forward to process the hash value for given message and in the meantime must 
be unfeasible to produce a message with a random hash and likewise be safe 
against modifying a message without the hash. We may come upon a long list 
of cryptographic hash functions, whereas many have been found to be liable 
and should not be used. Considering the integrity of information we may use 
hash function like SHA 1, MD2, MD4 and MD5 where each scheme can be 
employed to provide a digest of respective bits determined by the requirement 
of message or information integrity. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.3 Random Number Generator 
 A random number generator is a computational device built to create a 
sequence of numbers that doesn't have any pattern, i.e. have all the earmarks of 
being random[32]. The numerous usages of randomness have come about to 
the development of numerous diverse methods for producing random 
information. Random number generators are extremely productive in 
developing Monte Carlo-method simulations, as debugging is elevated by the 
possibility to run the same arrangement of random numbers again and again by 
beginning from the same random seed. They are additionally utilized in 
cryptography - so long as the seed is secret. Sender and receiver can handle the 
same set of numbers consequently to use as keys. There are two essential 
 
2.1.2 Cryptographic Hash Function 
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methods used to create random numbers. One ascertains some physical 
occasion that is required to be random and then adjusts for conceivable 
predispositions in the estimation process. Alternate makes utilization of 
computational calculations which can handle long chains of obviously random 
effects, which are indeed totaly dictated by a shorter introductory quality, 
called a seed or key. The recent sort is frequently known as pseudorandom 
number generators. 
 
2.1.4 Prime Numbers and Primality Test 
A primality test is an algorithm for figuring out whether an input number is 
prime. Throughout different fields of mathematics, it is utilized for 
cryptography[35]. Dissimilar to integer factorization, primality tests does not 
regularly give prime factors, it just states if the input number is prime or not. 
Factorization is thought to be a computationally troublesome issue, inasmuch 
as primality testing is almost simple. Primality tests could be characterized in 
two sorts: deterministic and probabilistic. 
 
Deterministic Algorithm: A deterministic primality testing calculation 
acknowledges an integer and dependably yields a prime or a composite. 
Deterministic tests focus with absolute certainty whether a number is prime. As 
of not long ago, all deterministic calculations were so lacking at discovering 
bigger primes that they were viewed as infeasible.  In 2002, Agrawal, Kayal 
and Saxena affirmed that that they had discovered an algorithm for primality 
testing with polynomial timecomplexity of O((log 12n)) . 
 
Probabilistic Algorithm: Probabilistic tests can conceivably (in spite of the fact 
that with little likelihood) falsely recognize a composite number as 
prime .However, they are when all is said in done much speedier than 
deterministic tests. Numbers that have passed a probabilistic prime test are 
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consequently appropriately alluded to as possible primes until their primality 
could be showed deterministically. 
 
2.2 Classification of group signature schemes 
The existing group signature schemes/protocols can be one of the four types, 
namely Static Group signature, secondly Dynamic group signature with 
revocation, third is group signature scheme with verifiable opening and the 
final group signature scheme where group manager can be distributed among 
different roles. The basic functionality remains similar following the 
standardized group signature scheme considering secret and public keys’ 
generation, the group key generation and, designated verification as well as 
opening of group signature. 
2.2.1 Static Group Signature 
Static group signatures contains four polynomial time algorithms[27] namely 
key generation in which the system generates the public key of the group, 
alongwith generating the secret key for signing of messages, signature 
generating algorithm which takes input the secret key and the information for 
signing and returns the signed message, signature verifcation algorithm which 
accepts input the public key of group, the signature with the document and 
returns the value as true or false, finally the opening algorithm which takes 
secret key of group manager, signed document and the signature to reveal the 
identity of user who signed. In general, a static group signature computes all 
the parameters initially with the members of the group and also revocation of 
existing member is possible only by removing of member. But addition of  any 
new member is not allowed. 
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Dynamic group signature [22] as suggested by the name is the non-
deterministic and randomness nature of scheme. The dynamic group signature 
contais five polynomial algorithms known as signature key parameter 
generation in which public parameters as well as secret parameters of a 
member is determined by generating a new list which keeps tracking the 
registration of group member, joining phase in which two algorithms are 
computed, firstly the member is registered into the registration list and then 
secondly the members’ parameters for signature are generated, signature 
generating algorithm which takes input the secret key and the information for 
signing and returns the signed message, signature verifcation algorithm which 
accepts input the public key of group, the signature with the document and 
returns the value as true or false thereby the validity of signature. Finally the 
opening algorithm which takes secret key of group manager, signed document 
and the signature to reveal the identity of user who signed the message. The 
difference between the static and dynamic group signature is the addition of 
join phase which  provides the full revocation as well as addition of new group 
members. 
 2.2.3 Group Signature with Verifiable Opening 
The main requirement of any digital signature is to protect the signers’ identity, 
still allowing the manager to reveal the anonymity in case of disputes by using 
the opening algorithm procedure. The group signature with verifable opening 
has five polynomial algorithm like the dynamic group signature. But the 
difference here is in the open phase, in which the algorithm is divided into two 
parts i.e. opening algorithm and the judging algorithm. The basic requirement 
of group signature scheme does not provide resources to the manager to accuse 
a member falsely of signature , thus assuring the integrity of the decision of 
manager, he has to provide additional proof against the member. The opening 
algorithm takes secret key of group manager, signed document and the 
2.2.2 Dynamic Group Signature 
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signature to reveal the identity of user who signed the message then in judge 
phase, algorithm input accepts the proof and signature, revealing the validity of 
signature  of manager by proving it a verified open phase. 
 
2.2.4 Group Signature with Distributed Roles 
Every Group signature scheme includes the group manager, who is responsible 
for many roles in the signature protocol. The manager has two major tasks i.e. 
the group membership and the signature opening, these two tasks can be 
divided into two different entitties namely, the issuer and the opener as 
distributed manager’s role. This group signature scheme contains the basic 
polynomial algorithms except differing in key generation in which the 
algorithm provides secret key to issuer and secret key to opener alongwith 
group’s public parameters, the issuer runs the join procedure in which the 
registration list is updated after every successful join operation and the opening 
procedure in which the other role i.e. opener opebns the signature in case of 
disputes. These can be made into the opening group signature with verification 
by including the proof and validity of judge. Another approach can be 
requirement of a third trusted party(TTP) to generate in advance both the 
private keys and then give the keys to the issuer and the opener respectively 
using secure channels. 
 2.3 Application of Group Signatures 
2.3.1 e-Voting 
 
E-voting also called as electronic voting is a method to cast votes and 
electronically count the votes. E-voting is supervised  physically by 
government representatives of and electoral authorities which are independent 
where group signature can be very useful. Voting is done within sole influence 
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of the voters, and since trusted party is needed to govern the voting scheme 
which is government authorities where  a vital role is played by the 
authorization, group signature can be best applicable. 
 
2.3.2 Sales and Auction System 
 
Electronic commerce, also known as e-commerce, is a type of business in 
which buying and selling of services and products is carries out over electronic 
systems like the Internet and other digital networks. It consists of the data 
exchanging thereby facilitating the financing and aspects of payment of 
business transactions. Group signature is also an efficient and  effective way of 
assuring security during communication within or with an organization. 
 
2.3.3 Corporate Organisation 
 
Every well developed organisation consist of many roles working for the 
achievement of particular aim that consists of sensible data to be shared among 
themselves, thus group signature can be an efficient way to validate the 
information among everyone thereby saving the valuable time by implementing 
a reliable approach. 
 
2.4 Literature review of Group signature schemes 
 2.4.1 Group Signature based on DLP 
Chaum and Heyst presented the group signature scheme based on DLP. In 
1997, Park, Kim and Won proposed an ID-based group signature [6]. The 
standard responsibility of their scheme is that signer's public key is 
identification (ID) that does not need to be verified, so there is no constraining 
motivation to set up a trusted center to verify a giant number of public keys. By 
the by, an ID-based group signature must ustilize a set of group member 
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identities in the signing phase. Exactly when the group member changes, the 
group signature is latent and plus the length of its signature increases with the 
measure of members.  In 1998, Lee and Chang proposed a capable group 
signature based on the discrete logarithm[18]. The scheme was more powerful 
the extent that computational, communication and storage costs are concerned, 
while allowing the group to be changed without having the members picking 
the new keys. Regardless, when the signer has been perceived, the authority 
must redistribute the keys of this signer and send the keys to him/her. In 1999, 
Tseng and Jan intended to upgrade the formerly expressed issue to propose an 
improved group signature that is based on the Lee-Chang scheme[8]. In that 
year, Sun exhibited in that the Tseng-Jan scheme is still not unlinkable. After 
that, Tseng-Jan [9] proposed to improve their scheme. In 2000, Li et al.[2] 
demonstrated that two schemes of the Tseng-Sun's paper, which are called Tj1 
and Tj2 in Li et al's paper, both could be attacked. The  threshold group 
signature is a key kind of signature. Various threshold group signatures are 
proposed however numerous accomplished conspiracy attack and are insecure.
 
 
2.4.2 Group Signature with anonymity and 
separability 
We have group signature based on strong separability Shundong Xia, where 
author proposed secure scheme based on discrete logarithm problem, such that 
group manager might be part into membership manager and revocation 
manager. Earlier proposed group signature scheme were not having identity 
regarding the public keys, thus requiring the manger to maintain data to map 
the identity information . 
The scheme recommended that past schemes may have frail manifestation of 
separability if proper communication is not accessible between revocation and 
membership manager hence defending strong separability.  
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In the paper Fucai Zhou, 2008 anonymity of signature was contrasted with the 
group signature where they examined a critical problem, that is the signatures 
are produced on behalf of group or group member and concluding that the 
signature ought to be produced on behalf of group and additionally pointed the 
conict of authenticated content[26]. In 2009, another enhanced group signature 
was presented  by Cheng Lee et al. where the problem of unlinkability and 
unforgeability was upgraded based on the discrete logarithm. 
 
2.4.3 Group Signature based on Threshold Scheme 
The group signature based on threshold scheme might be characterized as 
group oriented (t, n) traceable signers and group oriented anonymous signers. 
The signature was ended up being under forgery attack in paper proposed by 
Z.c. Li, 2001.threshold based signature was under revision by numerous 
authors and additionally being utilized within proxy and blind signaturesIn the 
paper Yuan-Lung Yu, 2005 the author consolidates the short mystery key 
characteristic for the elliptic curve cryptosystem and the (t, n) threshold 
strategy to make a signature scheme with simultaneous signing. The perceiving 
characteristic of the proposed scheme is that the threshold value indicates the 
minimum number of members required to process a valid group signature. All 
message recipients then can affirm the signature. Numerous threshold group 
signature schemes have been proposed, yet most of them encounter the sick 
impacts of conspiracy attack and are insecure. In this paper Fengyin Li, 2007, 
taking into account the discrete logarithm problem, an ensured threshold group 
signature scheme is proposed. The scheme is threshold-signing, and also 
threshold-verifying. In the paper, Fucai Zhou showed the essential of real 
group signature and gave an alternate scheme to comprehend a true group 
signature, which is focused around pivot threshold scheme[7].in 2011, 
Improvement of threshold group signature scheme was exhibited by Tong lu 
and Baoyuankang where the scheme proposes to be more secure as giving the 
strong unforgeability focused around discrete logarithm problem. 
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2.4.4 Short Group Signature 
The Group signature schemes are revised concerning numerous security factors 
where size of the signature was recognized to be principle issue by a few 
authors as contrasted with the complexities of signature generation schemes. In 
2004 Dan Boneh a short signature scheme was proposed where they gave a 
plan that has pretty nearly the size of RSA signature standard with same 
security. The plan was focused around bilinear groups with Strong Diffie 
Hellman assumptions (SDH). Many schemes were produced that might be 
productive and short in size yet acknowledging the security of the signature. In 
2006, the author acknowledged the formal security model which has been 
proposed by Bellare, Shi and Zang, including both dynamic groups,concurrent 
join and proposed amazingly dynamic short signature scheme with solid 
security under random oracle assumption[23]. The signature scheme was 
focused around Strong Diffie Hellman assumptions (SDH) and external Diffie 
Hellman assumptions. Starting late a paper on Short group signature with 
control linkability (Jung Yeon Hwang, Chung, Cho, & Nyang, 2011) focuses at 
giving dynamic membership where the controllable connection capacity 
enables an entity who has linking key to check if two signatures are from the 
same signer while protecting anonymity. The plan is sufficiently powerful and 
suitable for real-time applications even with restricted resources, for instance, 
vehicular adhoc network and Trusted Platform Module in the meantime plan 
supporting controllable connection capacity gives a signature that is shorter 
than the standard normal group signature. 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
The audit of group signature provides for us the thought of improvement of 
signature scheme with different security features to be appropriate in real time 
application, yet because of the complexities and active attacks analyzed, has 
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fizzled the scheme to be completely relevant. The most unpredictable attack is 
the colluding attack where the signature schemes proposed, recognizes just the 
features that are foreseeable. Accordingly assessing the schemes,we implement 
one of the recent schemes proposed by Krystian Baniak, in the year 2011, using 
elliptic curve cryptosystem. 
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Group Signature Scheme based on 
Eliptic Curve Cryptography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
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The key elements of Krystian’s group signature scheme are the following: 
Group Issuing Manager: (IM) – one who is responsible for the adding of 
group members alongwith the maintenance of the secret database of member 
certificates. The Group Manager has a isk key used for provisioning new 
members and implements group signature scheme phases like Join/Issue. 
 
Group Opening Manager: (GOM) – implemented on the Members List.  
• Open, used by the Opening manager GOM has a key omk that is used to open 
a signature and reveal the identity of the signing member. Open, actually 
performs a revocation of subscriber’s identity. 
 
Group Revocation Manager: (GRM) – It is used to revocate a member in the 
case of treachery. GRM uses the Remove procedure computed on the Group 
Member List. 
• Revoke, used to disable the group member, when necessary. 
 
Group Member: – any member, implementing the Sign procedure. 
 
The members of the group signature scheme, use the Sign procedure to 
authenticate messages and documents. Generally, the signature is 
constructed over the digest of the exchanged message. 
GMRL is a list of revoked group members that contains the following 
records: (TKi; Tr), where the token TKi is the revocation token of an 
member agi of index i, is created during the Join phase and Tr is the time 
of occurrence revocation. 
• a message digest function Hash 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Mechanism 
This group signature architecture proposed by Kristian Baniak[37] is a dynamic 
group signature scheme with application of revocable anonimity and 
distributed roles of the manager. The set of phases for this scheme consists of 
the following procedures: Issue/Join, Open, Revoke, Sign and finally Verify. 
Another key facility it provides for the scheme construction is the division of 
group manager’s responsibilities into the different modules. In addition the set 
of group signature scheme phases is partitioned into the public and protected 
classes thereby putting a limit to the number of the oracles to increase security 
access. 
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Procedure 3.2 Join & Issue Group Procedure 
 
The agent collector generates a key pair (pki; ski) ← Ks(1k) and signs it to 
produce 
sigi ← E(ski : pki). It also creates a revocation token RTi ← (R3; Ta) and 
creates its 
signature rsigi ← E(ski : R3; Ta). Both items are sent to the Central Repository 
that is the Group Manager: 
AGi → CR : E(KCR : (pki; sigi;RTi; rsigi); Ta;Na;Kr) 
The Agent Directory verifies the signatures sigi and sigR before continuing the 
procedure. When signatures match it generates the certificate: 
certi ← Sign(sks : (i; pki)) and formulates the response [4]. The response from 
the central repository agent is encrypted with the challenge Kr proposed by the 
agent collector: 
CR → AGi : E(Kr : (i; pki; sigi; certi);Na; Tc;E(K��1CR : Hash((i; pki; sigi; 
certi);Na; Tc))) 
CR → AD : E(KCD : agent = (i; pki; sigi; certi; agcid; Tc; TKi);E(K��1CR : 
H(agent))) 
The Agent Directory receives the new agent collector registration information 
and populates Agents[: : :] the table with the new entry. 
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3.9 Security Analysis & Correctness 
 
1. Unforgeability 
• Only members who successfully ‘join’ the group can sign a message and 
create a valid signature. 
 
2. Traceability and Anonymity 
• Only the Opening Manager, given a signature ‘Signature’, can discover 
(by the help of ‘Osk’-> Opening Manager Secret Key) identity of the 
group member who created ‘Signature’ (traceability) and an entity not 
holding an ‘Osk’ is unable to extract identity of the group member who 
created a signature (anonymity) 
 3. Correctness 
• Valid  signatures of the group members always verify correctly. 
• This requires that for all (Mpk, Msk) aloted to a member, every 
signature  created by a group member verify as valid, except when the 
user is revocated. 
 
 
0 1 2 0 1 2(E ,E , E , V ,V , V ,ACOM,BCOM,Vmpk,Vrev,M) valid (Vmpk,Vrev) RevocationListVerify = <=> ∉
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4. Unlinkability of the signatures 
• A signature is given by:- 
 
 
 
• where, most of the parameters are calculated from random values, hence, 
it is infeasible to decide whether two signatures have been created by the 
same group member or not. 
 5. No Framing 
• Even if all group members (and all the group managers) collude, they 
cannot forge a signature for a non-participating member as they cannot 
access Msk(x) of the group member (Secret Key of the group member). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0, 1 2(E E ,E ,ACOM,BCOM,c, taux, taus, taue', taut, tayE,index)Signature
 
• Revocation List:- List of individual (Mpk, Rpk) of each revocated 
member 
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Chapter 4 
 
Implementation and Results 
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4.1 Primality Test: Miller Rabin 
 
 
 
Fig 4.1 Primality Testing implementation 
Test Prime Number:     Generate Prime number: 
i/p: 516119616549881    i/p(no. of bits): 128 
o/p: PRIME  o/p: 
28850946349078705105295….55451 
 
i/p: 516119616549887    i/p:  512 
o/p: COMPOSITE     o/p: 7306357490132353367…. 
       ....022681527066844329…881 
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4.2 Group Signature Scheme Implementation:  
 
 
 
Fig 4.2 Application GUI view 
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4.3 Setup phase 
 
 
 
   4.3 Setup Issuing Manager 
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4.4 Setup Opening Manager 
 
 
 
 
   4.5 Setup Revocation Manager 
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4.4 Join Phase: 
 
 
4.6 Join Phase 
 
 
4.7 Issuing Manager GUI view 
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4.5 Sign: 
 
4.8 Signature Protocol 
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4.6 Verify:  Success 
 
 
 
 
 
4.9 Verify Protocol: Success 
 
 
 
 
4.10 Verify Protocol: Success GUI view 
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4.7 Verify:  Fail 
 
 
 
 
 
4.11 Verify Protocol: Failure 
 
 
 
 
4.12 Verify Protovol: Failure GUI view 
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4.8 Open: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.13 Open Protocol 
 
 
 
 
 
4.14 Open Protocol GUI view 
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4.9 Revocation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.15 Revocation Phase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.16 Revocation Phase GUI view  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Conclusion and Future Work 
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5.1 Conclusion and Future Work: 
The Group Signature scheme proposed by Krystian Baniak in 2011[3] was 
successfully implemented using elliptic curve cryptography and tested to work. 
The scheme satisfies the standard security features of basic group signature 
scheme like anonymity, unforgeability, and unlinkability.  Also the 
implemented scheme is member independent such that any member leaving or 
joining would not affect the signature generation scheme. This system is mostly 
concerned with maximal subscriber privacy and a verifiable evidence source. 
This scheme can also be applied in e-voting system, e-cash system and e-
commerce applications. Further research is, however, needed for ensuring 
resistance to Revocation List Oracle corruption and ability for an adversary to 
infer on agent’s identity knowing the date and time of given agent revocation. 
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